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CLASS ACTIONS IN ILLINOIS: A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO FEDERAL RULE 23?
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
has focused attention on the state class action procedure as an
alternative to a class suit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,1 the Court
severely limited the availability of the federal district courts as
a forum for the class action. The Court held that a class action
involving "separate and distinct ' 2 claims by each member of the
class cannot be maintained as a class action unless each member
of the class satisfies the jurisdictional amount of $10,000.3 It
is -no less than obvious that this ruling effectively bars access to
the federal courts of most potential class actions. It is rare indeed for persons to suffer damages of the jurisdictional amount
in a sufficient number at the hands of a single defendant to render the class action device available.
The effect of Zahn will be to force a considerable proportion
of potential class actions-those in which the claims of the members are "separate and distinct" and which do not satisfy the jurisdictional amount-into the state courts. Justice Brennan, in his
vigorous dissent, recognized the problem:
[I]f the State does not provide a Rule 23 (b) (3) device, litigation
of the claims of class members who either lack the jurisdictional
amount or simply prefer to litigate their claims in the state courts
. ..will produce a multitude of suits. And the chief influence
mitigating that flood-the fact that many of these [plaintiffs']
claims are likely to be worthless because the cost of asserting
them on a case-by-case basis will
exceed their potential valuewill do no judicial system credit. 4
The Zahn plaintiffs were a group of riparian landowners
who brought a nuisance action against a single defendant who
allegedly polluted their lake. Having been denied access to
the federal court because of lack of the requisite jurisdictional
amount, what recourse would be left to the Zahn class under
Illinois law? What remedy can be found in Illinois by any in1. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).

2. Id. at 300.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (diversity), § 1331(a) (federal question)
(1970). The Zahn decision will have no impact, of course, on federal
question class actions which are exempted from the jurisdictional amount
requirement. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1337 (commerce and antitrust), 1338 (patents, copyrights, trade-

marks and unfair competition), 1339 (postal matters), 1340 (internal
revenue), 1343 (civil rights) and 1344 (election disputes).
4. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 308 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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jured group by means of a class action? It is the purpose of this
article to answer these questions, but the best that can be done
is to explore Illinois decisional law, which does not provide a satisfactory answer for the plaintiff class.
Before delving into the morass which is the law of the Illinois
class action, some perspective can be gained by a brief examination of the utility of a class action and of Federal Rule 23.
THE CLASS ACTION-WHo NEEDS IT?

The class action was developed by the English courts of
equity as a practical solution to a practical problem. In situations in which a single defendant had, by one act or a series of
similar acts, caused injury to a group of persons, and in which
it was impossible or impractical to bring all those persons before
the court, a method was devised whereby one or a few of the
injured parties could bring suit on behalf of all. It was the
courts of equity which solved this problem by relaxing the strict
common law joinder rules and by allowing a member of the class
to represent the group in court.0 The class action is thus one
form of representative suit.0
The most consequential departure from the common law resulting from the development of the class action is that a judgment or decree is res judicata as to all members of the class,
whether or not they appear or otherwise participate in the conduct of the litigation. 7 To protect the absent members of the
class, the equity courts early imposed the requirement that the
representatives have common interests with those of the class
thus fairly and adequately representing all members." This requirement was later couched in terms of due process.9 A dissatisfied member of the class can attack a decree on due process
grounds by showing that his interests were not fairly and adequately represented. 10
Class actions have been used in an enormous variety of situa5. See generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

23.02 (2d ed.

1974); 7 WIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972

ed.). Professor Moore also recognizes two other early situations giving
impetus to the development of the class action-situations in which
abatement by death would prevent a decree, and situations in which
interested persons were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
6. A representative suit, as distinguished from a class suit, is any
situation in which a person may be bound by an adjudication when appearing before the court only through a representative.
7. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), Newberry Library v.
Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
8. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02 (2d ed. 1974), citing Leigh

v. Thomas, 2 Ves. Sr. 312 (1751), Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. Jr.
429 (1805).
9. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
10. Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678 (1951).
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tions," so that any attempted categorization is tenuous at best.
However, most writers agree that the three types specified by
the original Rule 23 represented the basic pattern. 12 Subdivision
23 (a) (1) was generally known as the "true" class action, 23 (a) (2)
as the "hybrid" class action, and 23(a) (3) as the "spurious" class
action. It was the common question, or spurious, class action
with which the Court in Zahn was concerned and in which each
member of the class must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. The
Zahn ruling does not involve the true or hybrid class action, in
which the claims of the members of the class may be aggregated
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 13 Thus, it is only the common question class action which now in instances of diversity
where the jurisdictional amount is lacking must be litigated in
14
the state courts.
The question of who needs the class action, after some reflection on the practical problem the device solves, becomes a simple
mathematical exercise. Whenever the amount of the individual
claims are too small to justify the expense of individual litigation,
the class action is needed. If it is not available in the particular
situation in which its use is desirable, the result is a wrong with
no adequate remedy.
THE COMMON QUESTION CLASS ACTION UNDER REVISED RULE

2311

In its present form, Rule 23 is the most complete and sophisticated solution yet devised to the class action problem. The trill. See generally Fox, Representative Actions and Proceedings, 1954
ILL. L.F. 94.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, prior to the 1966 amendment, provided:
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; (2) several, and the
object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may
affect specific property involved in the action; or (3) several, and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought.
13. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973), citing
Troy Bank v. Whitehead &Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
14. The jurisdictional amount requirement does not apply to federal
question suits exempted by statute. Note 3 supra.
15. FED. R. Crv. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
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partite categorization of the original rule has been replaced with
a two-step set of requirements for the maintainability of a class
action.' 6 Subdivision (a) states the basic prerequisites much as
contained in the original rule-numerosity, common questions of
law or fact, and the qualifications of the representatives. Subdivision (b) states three alternative requirements, one of which
must be met in addition to the requirements of subdivision (a).
Subdivision (b) (1) authorizes use of the class action in situations
in which individual actions would create a risk of varying adjudications for the party opposing the class,' 7 or the risk of non-litia class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions ....
(e) Dismissal or Compromise ....
16. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. Cirv. P. 23, U.S.C.A.,
295-96:
In practice the terms 'joint', 'common', etc. which were used as the
basis of the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and uncertain. ...
Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of
the judgments in class actions. . . . The 'spurious' action envisaged
by original Rule 23 was in any event an anomaly because, although
denominated a 'class' action and pleaded as such, it was supposed not
to adjudicate the rights or liabilities of any person not a party. ...
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions; provides that all class actions
maintained to the end as such will result in judgments including
those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or
not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to the measures
which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions.
17. The felt necessity for a class action is greatest when the courts
are called upon to order or sanction the alteration of the status quo
in circumstances such that a large number of persons are in a position to call on a single person to alter the status quo, or to complain
if it is altered, and the possibility exists that [the] actor might be
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gating members of the class being practically concluded by judgment.' 8 Subdivision (b) (2) sanctions use of the class action
where the relief sought is injunction or declaratory judgment.
Subdivision (b) (3) is the common question class action. The
(b) (3) class action is distinguished from the original "spurious"
class action because all members of the (b) (3) class are bound
by final judgment. Under the original Rule 23, non-party members of the class were bound only if they chose to intervene. 19
The (b) (3) class action is maintainable only if the court finds
that common questions predominate over individual questions
and that the class action is superior to other methods of adjudication such as test or model actions, consolidation or joint discovery. 20 Thus, even though the requirements for the maintainability of the common question class action are made explicit, the
court retains a considerable degree of discretion in the determination of whether to allow its use.
Subdivision (b) (3) further directs the court to consider the
factors there enumerated as A through D in determining whether
common questions predominate and whether the class action is
superior to other methods of litigation. Individual members of
the class may have substantial interest in controlling their own
litigation as where, for example, a few members have suffered
extensive damage as compared to the other members of the class.
Some members may have commenced litigation and wish to continue because of expenses incurred or good prospects of success.
It may prove desirable as a matter of pubic policy to allow the
litigation to proceed in the forums in which it would normally
be brought rather than to concentrate it in one court. Finally,
members of the class may be so numerous or widely dispersed
that management of the action becomes impracticable.
Since its adoption in 1966, revised Rule 23 has been the object
of much controversy in the legal community. Professor Moore
has this to say:
The (b) (3) class suit can be gargantuan in character; and little
more, functionally, than a suit by a lawyer with claim solicitation under the imprimatur of the court. But some distinguished jurors see a (b) (3) class suit, at least in certain areas
of security fraud and antitrust, as performing a 'prophylactic'
called upon to act in inconsistent ways.
LOUISELL & HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE:

STATE AND FEDERAL

719

(1962).
18. For example, the members of the class would be practically concluded by judgment in a shareholder's action for declaration of a dividend. See Knapp v. Banker's Securities Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa.
1954).

19. Note 16 supra.
20. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, U.S.C.A
299.
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function and having a 'theraputic' effect. There is great force
behind such views. Yet we question whether the federal courts
agencies; and some (b) (3) suits will
should become collection
21
cast them in that role.

being
Zahn has precluded the possibility of the federal courts
22
used as "collection agencies", at least in diversity cases.

Whether one agrees or disagrees that the class action is subject to too much abuse to justify its existence in our legal system,
one cannot deny that the result of Zahn is to shift the focus of
the argument from the federal to the state level. Does Illinois
provide a class action device to serve as a viable alternative to
Rule 23?
THE CLASS ACTION IN ILLINOIS

The law on class actions in Illinois is decisional rather than
statutory, with the exception of one section of the Civil Practice
23
Act governing the compromise and dismissal of class actions.
Certainly case law is not inherently less clear simply because it
has not been the object of legislative consideration. In the area
of class actions in Illinois, however, one is apt to find the task
of synthesizing and abstracting reliable legal precedent somewhat less than satisfying.
What follows is limited to the law as to what claims can be
maintained as class actions. It is worthy of note, however, that
Illinois decisional law is deficient, as compared to Rule 23, because of a lack of procedural guidelines concerning notice or con24
duct of the proceedings.
The confusion in the law of class actions in Illinois is not the
result of a dearth of consistent rules stated by the courts-on
the contrary, the rules of law are stated time and time again in
identical language. It is the application of these rules to the facts
in inconsistent ways which results in confusion. Moseid v. McDonough25 contains a marvelously concise statement of the rules,
but an analysis of the rules in light of the facts and holdings
of other cases shows that the rules alone are as useless as Midas'
touch.
The court in Moseid stated the Illinois law on the maintainability of class actions as follows:
[T]he test to be applied is the existence of a community of interest in the subject matter and a community of interest in the
remedy among all who make up the purported class. Factors to
21.
22.
23.
24.

3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-1, at 23-124 (2d ed. 1974).
Note 14 supra.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1973).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (d).

25. 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
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be considered in applying this test are: whether the claims of all
members of the class share a common question of law or fact,
such as the existence of a common fund from which relief can
be given; whether the causes of action of the members of the
class arise from the same transaction; whether one party can adequately represent the rights and interests of all other members
of the purported class; whether the number of possible class
members renders separate litigation impossible or impractical;
and whether there exists a purely equitable cause of action. 26
Framed in this manner, the sine qua non for the maintainability of a class action in Illinois is a community of interest in
the subject matter and the remedy among all members of the
class. The five "factors" are listed by the court as indications
of whether a community of interest exists. Each of the "factors",
however, are likely to be applied by the courts as requirements
rather than as community of interest indicia.
Community of Interest
The elusive "community of interest" refers to the relative
similarity of the legal interests of the members of the class.
Simply stated, the requirement is that all members of the class
have, to some degree, identical interests. Community of interest
in the subject matter means identity of cause of action, and has
28
27
been described as either identity of rights or identity of issues.
Community of interest in the remedy means essentially that all
members of the class must seek identical redress. The relief
sought may be injunction, 29 declaratory judgment,3 0 accounting, 3 1 impression of a constructive trust, 2 restitution 3 3 or other
relief in which all members of the class share jointly or proportionately. Recovery of money damages, as will be discussed below, 34 seems a highly doubtful remedy.
The problem is: to what degree must the members of the
class be identical as to their interests? Recall that the solution
26. Id. at 27-28, 243 N.E.2d at 396.
27. See, e.g., Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136
N.E.2d 796 (1956); Peoples Store v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995
(1942); Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968).
28. See, e.g., Dee-El Garage v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 289 N.E.2d 431
(1972); Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d
147 (1944).
29. See, e.g., Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.
2d 595 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Kuehn v. Bismarck Hotel Co., 52 Il. App. 2d 321, 202
N.E.2d 52 (1964).
31. See, e.g., Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. App. 135, 35 N.E.2d
545 (1941).
32. See, e.g., Schick-Johnson Co. v. Malan Construction Co., 49 Ill.
App. 2d 277, 200 N.E.2d 76 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N.E. 1009 (1895).
34. The requirements of a common fund and an equitable cause of action appear to severely restrict the recovery of money damages.
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of Rule 23(b) (3) to this problem is that the court must make
a preliminary determination that the "questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members".3 5 Rule 23 thus expressly allows the class action to be used in situations in which
members of the class have divergent interests. The federal court
has considerable discretion in allowing a class action to proceed
regardless of those divergent interests where they are outweighed by the desirability of litigating common issues in a single
action.
Illinois provides no such guidance for the court. As a result,
Illinois courts have been more restrictive than the federal courts
in allowing the class action to proceed because of a lack of community of interest. For example, use of the class action has generally been denied when individual members of the class have
dealt with the defendant in individual transactions on the basis
that separate proofs may be necessary.3 6
The Common Fund
The Moseid court indicates that one way to satisfy the requirement of community of interest is the existence of a common
fund from which recovery is sought.37 It is apparent that there
is a community of interest in the subject matter and the remedy
if a defendant has possession of an identifiable fund from which
each member of the class has an identical right to recover. It
does not follow, however, that the existence of a common fund
must be a prerequisite to the maintenance of every class action
in which the remedy sought is the recovery of money. Unfortunately, some Illinois courts have considered the common
fund to be such a prerequisite.
The common fund was first mentioned in Peoples Store v.
McKibbin,3 81 a suit by taxpayers of the same occupation against
the Illinois Director of Finance to enjoin the collection of taxes
on sales to exempt vendees under the Retailers Occupation Tax. 9
The plaintiffs attempted to bring suit as a class action representing all taxpayers of the same occupation. They also requested
an accounting and a refund of taxes wrongfully collected. In
holding that this situation was not proper for the use of a class
action, the court relied on the fact that the taxes wrongfully collected did not constitute a separate fund:
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3).
36. See text accompanying notes 48-54 infra.
37. Note 26 supra.
38. 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942). See also Material Service Co.
v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 43 N.E.2d 939 (1942).
39. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 120,

445 (1939).
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A decision sustaining [plaintiffs'] view that no tax is due does
not create any fund from which reimbursement can be made,
neither does it establish the existence of a right of recovery in
40
every vendor.
Although the court also relied on the fact that each member
of the purported class had to make separate proof of his right
to recover, this decision has been cited as late as 1972 in Reardon
v. Ford Motor Co.41 for the proposition that a common fund is
a prerequisite to the maintenance of a class action where the remedy sought is the recovery of money.
Reardon was a products liability action brought on behalf of
a class of approximately four million purchasers of allegedly defective automobiles. The appellate court for the third district refused to allow the class action to proceed. After stating the general rule of community of interest in the subject matter and the
remedy, the court continued:
[A] further ingredient must be present if a class action is to
stand and that additional requisite is the necessity of a common
fund from which reimbursement to the members of the class
could be made ....
We do not deem it to be mandatory that
there be in esse a common fund in every instance if a class action
is to be sustained ....
[I]n the case now before
us we hold a common fund to be a
42
necessary requirement.
The court further held that a common fund cannot be created
from the general assets of a corporation.
Presumably then, a class action will not lie for the recovery
of money unless there is a clearly identifiable fund in which the
members of the class share a claim. Can a defendant prevent
the use of a class action against him simply by mingling the funds
over which plaintiffs have a claim with his other assets? Moseid
lends some support to this ludicrous proposition.
In Moseid, plaintiff sued on behalf of all persons who had
paid a statutorily required one dollar library fee upon filing appearances as defendants in the Cook County Circuit Court. 43 Defendant, the Clerk of the Circuit Court, attacked the use of the
class action on the basis that there was no common fund. The
court disagreed, holding that there was a common fund and that
the use of the class action was proper. The Moseid court thus
distinguished Peoples Stores:
[That case is] distinguishable, however, on the basis that none
40. Peoples Store v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 154, 39 N.E.2d 995, 998

(1942).
41. 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972).

42. Id. at 343-45, 287 N.E.2d at 523-24.
43. County Law Library Act, ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 81, § 81 (1963).
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of the purported class members there, with the exception of the
plaintiff . . . had paid any money under the section relating to

payment under protest; so the taxes on which refunds were
sought had been turned over to the State Treasurer and deposited
in the general fund of the State of Illinois. Thus, there was
no fund in being in [that case], whereas, in the present case,
the County Law
Library Act establishes a separate 'County Law
44
Library Fund'.
It appears from this reasoning that the maintainability of a class
action depends on the fortuitous circumstance that defendant's
accounting procedure has maintained the separate identity of the
funds in question.
The First District, in Perlman v. First National Bank,45 recognized the absurdity of the situation, creating a conflict with
its own decision in Moseid and with that of the Third District
in Reardon. The plaintiff class was composed of all borrowers
from the bank in an action for declaratory judgment and an accounting. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's method of computing interest on loans constituted a breach of contract and a violation of the Illinois Interest Act. 46 Defendant attacked the propriety of the class action on the basis that there was no common
fund, since any money over which members of the class might
have a claim because of improperly computed interest was
mingled with defendant's other assets. The court followed the
logic of the situation rather than case precedent, much to its
credit:
There seems no basis in law or logic for permitting a class action against an individual who has sequestered all money wrongfully acquired but denying one against an individual who has
comingled it with his other assets ....
The liability or wrongdoing creates the fund, and whatever is taken wrongfully consti47
tutes the fund.
The Perlman court thus satisfied the requirement of a common fund by the determination that any money wrongfully
taken constituted the requisite fund. One would hope that in
the future, the Illinois courts will accomplish expressly what the
Perlman court did impliedly-eliminate any requirement of a
common fund.
Common Transaction
Another factor mentioned by the Moseid court as indicative
of the required community of interest is whether the causes of
44. Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 28, 243 N.E.2d 394, 396
(1968).
45. 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236 (1973).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 9, 10 (1973).

47. Perlman v. First National Bank, 15 1ll. App. 3d 784, 800-801, 305
N.E.2d 236, 249 (1973).
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action of the members of the class arise from the same transaction. The Illinois courts have generally refused to permit the
class action to be used where each member of the purported class
must make separate proof of an element of the cause of action
48
because the claims arose out of separate transactions.
A brief analysis of the Illinois experience with class actions
based on fraud will serve to indicate the attitude of the courts
toward separate transactions among members of the class. 49 The
leading case in this -area is Langson v. Goldberg5" in which the
plaintiff bondholder sued on behalf of other bondholders for specific performance of certain covenants made by defendant issuer
concerning repayment of principal. Defendant asserted that the
named plaintiff was not a proper representative because some of
the bondholders had signed waivers of the covenents sought to
be enforced. Plaintiff responded that the members of the class
who had signed waivers had been induced to sign by defendant's
fraud.
On the basis that allegations of fraud are personal, requiring
individual proof, and thus cannot be litigated in a representative
proceeding, the court held that plaintiff was not a proper representative as to members of the class who had signed waivers. It
thus became established in Illinois that actions based on fraud,
requiring separate proof of the elements of misrepresentation or
reliance, are not proper situations for the use of the class action.5 1
One case which has allowed an action based on fraud to proceed as a class action is Kimbrough v. Parker.52 Five named
plaintiffs sued on behalf of 3,300 entrants in an allegedly fraudulent puzzle contest. The court determined that the class action
could proceed because the solicitation of all members of the class
had been through newspaper advertisements so that proof of the
element of misrepresentation could be made on behalf of all
members. This case is clearly distinguishable from Langson on
its facts because no personal contact was involved in soliciting
contest entrants.
48. See Langson v. Goldberg, 373 Il1. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940); Fisher
v. City of Ottawa, 8 Ill. App. 3d 553, 289 N.E.2d 717 (1972); Schick-Johnson Co. v. Malan Construction Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 277, 200 N.E.2d 76

(1964).
49. See generally Comment, Class Actions and the Illinois Consumer,
4 J. MAR. J. 217 (1971), in which the author concludes that the law on
class actions in Illinois is too restrictive to provide an adequate remedy
for a class of defrauded consumers.
50. 373 Ill. 294, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940).

51. See Rice v. Snarlin Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 433. 266 N.E.2d 183 (1970)
in which a class action based on fraud was denied on the basis that personal solicitations by defendant of each member of the class constituted

separate transactions for which separate proof was necessary, even

though plaintiff showed that the solicitations were the same in every instance.
52. 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
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It appears, then, that the Illinois courts will allow a class action involving separate transactions only where the transactions
are shown to be substantially identical so that proof of one can
serve as proof of all. 53 The drafters of Rule 23 took a more flex54
ible approach.
Adequacy ,of Representation
Although the Moseid court mentioned the adequacy of representation only as a factor to be considered in determining
whether community of interest is present, representation of the
interests of the non-party members of the class is essentially a
due process problem. Where it appears that the named plaintiffs
do not adequately represent the interests of all members of the
class, the suit cannot proceed as a class action.55 This result is
justified on the basis that the inadequately represented members
of the class would not be bound by judgment. Normally, any
final adjudication in a class suit is res judicata as to all members
of the class. However, any member of the class who can show
that the named plaintiff was not a qualified representative will
not be bound. 56
The following statement from the leading case in Illinois on
due process in class actions, Newberry Library v. Board of Education,5 7 is often cited:
It is not required by the fourteenth amendment that either
courts or legislative departments adopt any particular rule for
53. See also Boner v. Drazek, 55 Ill. 2d 279, 302 N.E.2d 280 (1973);
Perlman v. First National Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236
(1973). But see Rodriguez v. Credit Systems Specialists, Inc., 17 Ill. App.
3d 606, 308 N.E.2d 342 (1974) in which plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class
of persons who had entered identical contracts with defendant for the
consolidation of debts. Although recognizing that separate transactions
were involved, the court stated:
[T]he better view seems to be that notwithstanding whether separate transactions are involved, the existence of a community of interest must be determined in each case from the nature of the action
according to the difficulties of administering justice through the
medium of a class action as compared with those involved in separate suits.
Id. at 611, 308 N.E.2d at 347.
54. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. CIrv. P. 23,
U.S.C.A., 299:
A fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and
it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the
class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a
fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there
was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds
or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed.
For a unique solution to the problem of proof when separate transactions are involved, see Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971).
55. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
56. Id.
57. 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
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establishing the conclusiveness of decrees in class suits, but where
it can be said that the procedure adopted fairly insures the protection of the interests of the absent parties who are to be bound
by such proceeding, such does not fail of due process. The test
is whether those sought to be bound as members of the class
are in fact adequately represented by the parties who actually
participate in the conduct of litigation . ..
Adequacy of representation is not related to whether the
representatives or their attorneys do in fact vigorously and competently assert their claims. Rather, representation is said to be
inadequate when the interests of the named plaintiffs are in conflict with the interests of some or all members of the class.5 9 It
is not essential, however, that all members of the class have an
interest in every matter involved in the suit.6 0 Further, the assertion of hypothetical variations in the interests of members of
the class is not sufficient to prevent the use of the class action. 61
It will be noted that the requirement of fair and adequate
representation is contained in Rule 23 in subdivision (a) (4). Since
this requirement is essentially a constitutional problem controlled by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it
has been developed and applied in much the same manner both
in the Illinois courts and in the federal courts.
Numerosity
Numerosity of interested persons is another basic requirement to the maintenance of a class action. A prerequisite to the
use of a class suit, and one of the original justifications for its
development, is that the members of the class are too numerous
to bring before the court.6 2 Both in the Illinois courts63 and in
the federal courts 64 a preliminary determination must be made
that the numerosity of interested persons renders use of the class
action desirable.
It is well settled in Illinois, however, that numerosity alone
is not sufficient to justify the use of a class action. 5 For example, if the named plaintiff does not adequately represent the
58. Id. at 90, 55 N.E.2d at 151.
59. See Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.
2d 796 (1956); Hale v. Hale, 146 Mll. 227, 33'N.E. 858 (1893); Southeast
National Bank v. Board of Education, 298 Ill. App. 92, 18 N.E.2d 584
(1938).
60. Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d
796 (1956).
61. Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595
(1959).
62. Note 5 supra.
63. Fox, supra note 11, at 106.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
65. Reardon v. Ford Motor Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519
(1972).
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interests of the class,6 6 if the members of the class must make
individual proof of an element of the cause of action, 67 or if there
is no common fund in an action for the recovery of money, 68 the
class action may be denied regardless of the number of members
in the purported class and regardless of whether the claims of
the members may not be large enough to justify individual litigagation.
Equitable Cause of Action
The most restrictive requirement in Illinois, as compared to
Rule 23, is that a class action is allowed only where the cause
of action is cognizable in equity. This requirement is founded
on the reasoning that since the class suit was developed in the
courts of equity, actions properly cognizable at law cannot be litigated as class actions.6 9 This requirement has prevented the use
of the class suit in actions for damages for breach of contract,70
in mandamus actions 71 and in deceit actions. 72 The following is
typical of the arbitrary manner in which the Illinois courts apply
the rule:
Representative, or class suits, are allowed only where the question is of a common or general interest, where one sues for the
benefit of the whole. In all such cases the parties stand in the
same situation, having one common right or one common interest.
We find no cases deciding that mere numerousness of parties
alone will confer jurisdiction upon a court of equity in a case
73
that is properly cognizable at law.
The only justification offered by the courts for this rule disallowing a class action merely because the cause of action is "properly
cognizable at law", even where all other requirements are met,
is that the class action is unique to the equity courts. The merger
74
of law and equity courts in Illinois had no effect on the rule.
The difficulty with the rule comes in defining "cognizable in
equity" and "cognizable at law". The basic principle of equity
jurisdiction is that equity takes jurisdiction where the remedy
at law is inadequate. Is not the remedy at law inadequate in
any action, whether traditionally labeled legal or equitable, when
66. See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 37-47 supra.
69. Fox, supra note 11, at 97-98.
70. Murley v. Local Union No. 147, 133 Ill. App. 2d 578, 273 N.E.2d
538 (1971); Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 Ill. App. 191, 106 N.E.2d
735 (1952).
71. Retail Liquor Dealers Protective Assn. v. Schreiber, 382 Ill. 454,
47 N.E.2d 462 (1943); People ex rel. Aramburu v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill.
App. 2d 184, 219 N.E.2d 548 (1966).
72. Fetherston v. National Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill. App. 151
(1935).
73. Id. at 160.
74. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 1 (1973).
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the individual expense of bringing suit is prohibitive because of
the relatively small individual claims? The answer seems obvious, because in such a situation there is, in effect, no remedy
at all. Yet the Illinois courts have consistently maintained that
a legal action is not maintainable as a class suit. 7 5 Unless the
attorney frames his complaint to avoid its effect, this rule requires the dismissal of any class suit for money damages based
on contract or tort regardless of whether all other requirements
to the maintenance of a class suit are met.
CONCLUSION

Illinois does not have a viable alternative to the common
question class action under Rule 23(b) (3). Not only is the decisional law in an unsatisfactory condition because of the inconsistency between districts and even within districts, but the principles which can be extracted from the cases present limitations
to the maintainability of the common question class suit that go
far beyond the limitations of Rule 23.
Consider the plight of the Zahn class which had been denied
access to the federal court because of a failure to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. They were forced to bring their class suit, if
at all, in the state court. In Illinois, they would be faced with
an insuperable number of tenable arguments which could be
made by the defendant against the use of a class action. The
defendant could successfully argue that a nuisance action for
damages is properly cognizable at law so that the court does not
have equity jurisdiction, that there is no common fund from
which recovery could be had, and that there is no community of
interest in the subject matter because separate proofs would
be required on the issue of damages. The result is that the
members of the class would be required to litigate individually. If they chose to do so, the effect would be a multitude
of suits further congesting the courts. If the cost of individual
litigation proves prohibitive, the practical effect would be a
wrong with no remedy.
In light of the restrictions placed upon use of the federal
class action procedure7 6 , and in light of the inadequacy of the
75. Rule 23 and its predecessor, Rule 38 of the Equity Rules of 1912,

have always applied to all civil actions, legal or equitable.
FEDERAL PRACTICE,

23.02 (2d ed. 1974).

3B J.

MOORE,

76. In addition to the jurisdictional amount restriction of Zahn, the
Supreme Court has determined that named plaintiffs in a Rule 23 class
action must bear the cost of notice to all members of the class who can
be identified through reasonable effort under Rule 23(c) (2). Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). When the number of class
members renders the cost of notice prohibitive, Rule 23 is not a feasible

method of litigation.
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Illinois decisional law of class actions, the development of a viable class action procedure would appear an appropriate subject
for legislative consideration. The Illinois Constitution of 1970
mandates that "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation." 77 Although this language is essentially hortatory, it does indicate the intent of the framers of
78
It
the constitution that no wrong should go without a remedy.
is submitted that the Illinois law on class actions presents just
such a situation. Certainly the experience of the federal courts
with Rule 23 could provide sufficient guidance to the Illinois legislature in creating a statutory class action device to provide the
remedy which is now lacking.
Michael J. Meyer

77. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
78. For a discussion of the hortatory effect of the section, see Gertz,
Hortatory Language in the Preamble and Bill of Rights of the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 217 (1973).

